Closing the Door on Net-NTLMv1: Releasing Rainbow Tables to Accelerate Protocol Deprecation

Mandiant has publicly released comprehensive Net-NTLMv1 rainbow tables to accelerate the deprecation of this deprecated and insecure authentication protocol. Despite being known vulnerable since at least 1999, Net-NTLMv1 remains prevalent in many environments, enabling trivial credential theft through known-plaintext attacks. The released dataset allows security professionals to recover encryption keys in under 12 hours using consumer hardware, potentially compromising user and machine account password hashes. Attackers commonly combine authentication coercion tools like DFSCoerce or PetitPotam with Responder to capture hashes, which can then be cracked and used for DCSync attacks to compromise entire Active Directory domains. Organizations must immediately disable Net-NTLMv1 by configuring group policy to 'Send NTLMv2 response only' and implement monitoring for NTLMv1 authentication events (Event ID 4624) to detect exploitation attempts.

Written by: Nic Losby Introduction Mandiant is publicly releasing a comprehensive dataset of Net-NTLMv1 rainbow tables to underscore the urgency of migrating away from this outdated protocol. Despite Net-NTLMv1 being deprecated and known to be insecure for over two decades—with cryptanalysis dating back to 1999—Mandiant consultants continue to identify its use in active environments. This legacy protocol leaves organizations vulnerable to trivial credential theft, yet it remains prevalent due to inertia and a lack of demonstrated immediate risk. By releasing these tables, Mandiant aims to lower the barrier for security professionals to demonstrate the insecurity of Net-NTLMv1. While tools to exploit this protocol have existed for years, they often required uploading sensitive data to third-party services or expensive hardware to brute-force keys. The release of this dataset allows defenders and researchers to recover keys in under 12 hours using consumer hardware costing less than $600 USD. This initiative highlights the amplified impact of combining Mandiant's frontline expertise with Google Cloud's resources to eliminate entire classes of attacks. This post details the generation of the tables, provides access to the dataset for community use, and outlines critical remediation steps to disable Net-NTLMv1 and prevent authentication coercion attacks. Background Net-NTLMv1 has been widely known to be insecure since at least 2012, following presentations at DEFCON 20, with cryptanalysis of the underlying protocol dating back to at least 1999 . On Aug. 30, 2016, Hashcat added support for cracking Data Encryption Standard (DES) keys using known plaintext, further democratizing the ability to attack this protocol. Rainbow tables are almost as old, with the initial paper on rainbow tables published in 2003 by Philippe Oechslin , citing an earlier iteration of a time-memory trade-off from 1980 by Martin Hellman . Essentially, if an attacker can obtain a Net-NTLMv1 hash without Extended Session Security (ESS) for the known plaintext of 1122334455667788 , a cryptographic attack, referred to as a known plaintext attack (KPA), can be applied. This guarantees recovery of the key material used. Since the key material is the password hash of the authenticating Active Directory (AD) object—user or computer—the attack results can quickly be used to compromise the object, often leading to privilege escalation. A common chain attackers use is authentication coercion from a highly privileged object, such as a domain controller (DC). Recovering the password hash of the DC machine account allows for DCSync privileges to compromise any other account in AD. Dataset Release The unsorted dataset can be downloaded using gsutil -m cp -r gs://net-ntlmv1-tables/tables . or through the Google Cloud Research Dataset portal . The SHA512 hashes of the tables can be checked by first downloading the checksums gsutil -m cp gs://net-ntlmv1-tables/tables.sha512 . then checked by sha512sum -c tables.sha512 . The password cracking community has already created derivative work and is also hosting the ready to use tables. Use of the Tables Once a Net-NTLMv1 hash has been obtained, the tables can be used with historical or modern reinventions of rainbow table searching software such as rainbowcrack (rcrack) , or RainbowCrack-NG on central processing units (CPUs) or a fork of rainbowcrackalack on graphics processing units (GPUs). The Net-NTLMv1 hash needs to be preprocessed to the DES components using ntlmv1-multi as shown in the next section . Obtaining a Net-NTLMv1 Hash Most attackers will use Responder with the --lm and --disable-ess flags and set the authentication to a static value of 1122334455667788 to only allow for connections with Net-NTLMv1 as a possibility. Attackers can then wait for incoming connections or coerce authentication using a tool such as PetitPotam or DFSCoerce to generate incoming connections from DCs or lower privilege hosts that are useful for objective completion. Responses can be cracked to retrieve password hashes of either users or computer machine accounts. A sample workflow for an attacker is shown below in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3. Figure 1: DFSCoerce against a DC Figure 2: Net-NTLMv1 hash obtained for DC machine account Figure 3: Parse Net-NTLMv1 hash to DES parts Figure 4 illustrates the processing of the Net-NTLMv1 hash to the DES ciphertexts. Figure 4: Net-NTLMv1 hash to DES ciphertexts An attacker then takes the split-out ciphertexts to crack the keys used based on the known plaintext of 1122334455667788 with the steps of loading the tables shown in Figure 5 and cracking results in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Figure 5: Loading DES components for cracking Figure 6: First hash cracked Figure 7: Second hash cracked and run statistics An attacker can then calculate the last remaining key with ntlmv1-multi once again, or look it up with twobytes , to recreate the full NT hash for the DC account with the last key part shown in Figure 8. Figure 8: Calculate remaining key The result can be checked with hashcat's NT hash shucking mode , -m 27000 , as shown in Figure 9. Figure 9: Keys checked with hash shucking An attacker can then use the hash to perform a DCSync attack targeting a DC and authenticating as the now compromised machine account. The attack flow uses secretsdump.py from the Impacket toolsuite and is shown in Figure 10. Figure 10: DCSync attack performed Remediation Organizations should immediately disable the use of Net-NTLMv1. Local Computer Policy "Local Security Settings" > "Local Policies" > "Security Options" > “Network security: LAN Manager authentication level" > "Send NTLMv2 response only". Group Policy "Computer Configuration" > "Policies" > "Windows Settings" > "Security Settings" > "Local Policies" > "Security Options" > "Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level" > "Send NTLMv2 response only" As these are local to the computer configurations, attackers can and have set the configuration to a vulnerable state to then fix the configuration after their attacks have completed with local administrative access. Monitoring and alerting of when and where Net-NTLMv1 is used is needed in addition to catching these edge cases. Filter Event Logs for Event ID 4624: "An Account was successfully logged on." > "Detailed Authentication Information" > "Authentication Package" > "Package Name (NTLM only)", if "LM" or "NTLMv1" is the value of this attribute, LAN Manager or Net-NTLMv1 was used. Related Reading This project was inspired by and referenced the following research published to blogs, social media, and code repositories. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkPvZDcrLFk https://crack.sh/netntlm/ https://hashcat.net/forum/thread-9009.html https://swisskyrepo.github.io/InternalAllTheThings/active-directory/hash-capture/#capturing-and-cracking-net-ntlmv1ntlmv1-hashestokens https://en.hackndo.com/ntlm-relay/#stop-using-ntlmv1 https://www.praetorian.com/blog/ntlmv1-vs-ntlmv2/ https://trustedsec.com/blog/practical-attacks-against-ntlmv1 https://github.com/NotMedic/NetNTLMtoSilverTicket https://x.com/jeffmcjunkin/status/1575515827880665088 https://shuck.sh/get-shucking.php Acknowledgements Thank you to everyone who helped make this blog post possible, including but not limited to Chris King and Max Gruenberg.

Mandiant has publicly released comprehensive Net-NTLMv1 rainbow tables to accelerate the deprecation of this deprecated and insecure authentication protocol. Despite being known vulnerable since at least 1999, Net-NTLMv1 remains prevalent in many environments, enabling trivial credential theft through known-plaintext attacks. The released dataset allows security professionals to recover encryption keys in under 12 hours using consumer hardware, potentially compromising user and machine account password hashes. Attackers commonly combine authentication coercion tools like DFSCoerce or PetitPotam with Responder to capture hashes, which can then be cracked and used for DCSync attacks to compromise entire Active Directory domains. Organizations must immediately disable Net-NTLMv1 by configuring group policy to 'Send NTLMv2 response only' and implement monitoring for NTLMv1 authentication events (Event ID 4624) to detect exploitation attempts. Written by: Nic Losby Introduction Mandiant is publicly releasing a comprehensive dataset of Net-NTLMv1 rainbow tables to underscore the urgency of migrating away from this outdated protocol. Despite Net-NTLMv1 being deprecated and known to be insecure for over two decades—with cryptanalysis dating back to 1999—Mandiant consultants continue to identify its use in active environments. This legacy protocol leaves organizations vulnerable to trivial credential theft, yet it remains prevalent due to inertia and a lack of demonstrated immediate risk. By releasing these tables, Mandiant aims to lower the barrier for security professionals to demonstrate the insecurity of Net-NTLMv1. While tools to exploit this protocol have existed for years, they often required uploading sensitive data to third-party services or expensive hardware to brute-force keys. The release of this dataset allows defenders and researchers to recover keys in under 12 hours using consumer hardware costing less than $600 USD. This initiative highlights the amplified impact of combining Mandiant's frontline expertise with Google Cloud's resources to eliminate entire classes of attacks. This post details the generation of the tables, provides access to the dataset for community use, and outlines critical remediation steps to disable Net-NTLMv1 and prevent authentication coercion attacks. Background Net-NTLMv1 has been widely known to be insecure since at least 2012, following presentations at DEFCON 20, with cryptanalysis of the underlying protocol dating back to at least 1999 . On Aug. 30, 2016, Hashcat added support for cracking Data Encryption Standard (DES) keys using known plaintext, further democratizing the ability to attack this protocol. Rainbow tables are almost as old, with the initial paper on rainbow tables published in 2003 by Philippe Oechslin , citing an earlier iteration of a time-memory trade-off from 1980 by Martin Hellman . Essentially, if an attacker can obtain a Net-NTLMv1 hash without Extended Session Security (ESS) for the known plaintext of 1122334455667788 , a cryptographic attack, referred to as a known plaintext attack (KPA), can be applied. This guarantees recovery of the key material used. Since the key material is the password hash of the authenticating Active Directory (AD) object—user or computer—the attack results can quickly be used to compromise the object, often leading to privilege escalation. A common chain attackers use is authentication coercion from a highly privileged object, such as a domain controller (DC). Recovering the password hash of the DC machine account allows for DCSync privileges to compromise any other account in AD. Dataset Release The unsorted dataset can be downloaded using gsutil -m cp -r gs://net-ntlmv1-tables/tables . or through the Google Cloud Research Dataset portal . The SHA512 hashes of the tables can be checked by first downloading the checksums gsutil -m cp gs://net-ntlmv1-tables/tables.sha512 . then checked by sha512sum -c tables.sha512 . The password cracking community has already created derivative work and is also hosting the ready to use tables. Use of the Tables Once a Net-NTLMv1 hash has been obtained, the tables can be used with historical or modern reinventions of rainbow table searching software such as rainbowcrack (rcrack) , or RainbowCrack-NG on central processing units (CPUs) or a fork of rainbowcrackalack on graphics processing units (GPUs). The Net-NTLMv1 hash needs to be preprocessed to the DES components using ntlmv1-multi as shown in the next section . Obtaining a Net-NTLMv1 Hash Most attackers will use Responder with the --lm and --disable-ess flags and set the authentication to a static value of 1122334455667788 to only allow for connections with Net-NTLMv1 as a possibility. Attackers can then wait for incoming connections or coerce authentication using a tool such as PetitPotam or DFSCoerce to generate incoming connections from DCs or lower privilege hosts that are useful for objective completion. Responses can be...