Implications of Russia-India-China Trilateral Cooperation

This Insikt Group analysis examines emerging trilateral cooperation between Russia, China, and India following their August 2025 SCO Summit meeting. US sanctions and tariffs emerge as primary drivers pushing these nations toward alternative economic and strategic partnerships. Key barriers include deep China-India distrust stemming from border disputes and regional competition. While all three seek a multipolar world order through BRICS and SCO forums, India's strategic autonomy doctrine limits commitment to an anti-Western bloc. Implications include potential regulatory shifts affecting private sector operations, defense industry consolidation, and increased competition in dual-use technology markets. Organizations should monitor for supply chain disruptions and evolving sanctions compliance requirements as this trilateral relationship develops.

Examines Russia-India-China trilateral cooperation, U.S. tariffs and sanctions, why a formal bloc is unlikely, and implications for governments and business.

This Insikt Group analysis examines emerging trilateral cooperation between Russia, China, and India following their August 2025 SCO Summit meeting. US sanctions and tariffs emerge as primary drivers pushing these nations toward alternative economic and strategic partnerships. Key barriers include deep China-India distrust stemming from border disputes and regional competition. While all three seek a multipolar world order through BRICS and SCO forums, India's strategic autonomy doctrine limits commitment to an anti-Western bloc. Implications include potential regulatory shifts affecting private sector operations, defense industry consolidation, and increased competition in dual-use technology markets. Organizations should monitor for supply chain disruptions and evolving sanctions compliance requirements as this trilateral relationship develops. Examines Russia-India-China trilateral cooperation, U.S. tariffs and sanctions, why a formal bloc is unlikely, and implications for governments and business. Executive Summary Insikt Group assesses that the August 2025 meeting of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit likely suggests early interest among the three states to explore trilateral cooperation, though the formation of a resilient bloc remains unlikely. United States (US) policy –– particularly the level of sanctions the US places on each country –– is likely one of the primary factors driving the three states to change their level of cooperation. An increase in US sanctions is likely to drive each state to pursue alternative markets; this motivation has led to an acceleration of trilateral cooperation in some areas, and a reduction in others. For example, President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on India in mid-2025 very likely amplified a warming China-India relationship and reinforced a stable India-Russia relationship. In contrast, US sanctions on Russian oil companies in October 2025 led China and India to decrease their level of Russian oil imports. The second factor driving Russia, India, and China to explore trilateral cooperation is very likely their shared strategic interest in a multipolar global order — manifest through fora like SCO and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). However, despite nascent trilateral cooperation, there remains significant divergence among the three countries’ foreign policy goals, governing principles, and economic ambitions, which likely limits the scope of their cooperation. The political, economic, and military dynamics that shape bilateral relationships between China-Russia, China-India, and India-Russia are complex and distinct. Of those relationships, challenges between Beijing and New Delhi are almost certainly the greatest barrier to the formation of a trilateral bloc or alliance. In particular, India’s competition with China for Asia-Pacific regional leadership and influence, a large trade deficit favoring China, and unresolved border disputes will very likely temper the depth of cooperation between the two. All three countries seek to create an alternative center of gravity to the West, but India does not share Russia’s or China’s staunchly anti-Western worldview. Although BRICS and SCO almost certainly represent viable opportunities for the three countries to foster trilateral cooperation, significant limitations prevent deeper alignment within these fora. The Russia-India-China (RIC) dialogue format, if rejuvenated, would offer the most likely format to formalize trilateral alignment. Insikt Group identified a range of potential indicators that are likely to reflect a coalescence into a political, economic, or military bloc. Deepening trilateral coordination would almost certainly have broad implications for both the public and private sectors, depending on the depth and intensity of the cooperation. For example, the formation of trilateral economic frameworks, such as lower trade barriers or coordinated regulatory schemes, would force private sector companies operating in any of these countries to adapt to new regulatory standards and potentially face increased competition from an enlarged trilateral economic market. Deeper defense cooperation could lead to shifts in the defense industry of each country, as markets adjust to serve the defense needs of each member of the trilateral. If this leads Chinese and Indian defense industries to increasingly look to serve Russian defense needs, it could force companies that currently produce dual-use technologies for China and India to make adjustments to avoid transacting with sanctioned Russian defense entities. Key Findings The single greatest impediment to trilateral cooperation is very likely the deep distrust between China and India, which underpins political, economic, and military competition — including a decades-long border...